The limits and the use of Union's competences are governed by tree principles: principal of conferral, principle of subsidiarity and principle of proportionality (Article 5 TEU).
5
Since the CFR raised a concern about the possibility of widening Union's competences, additional safeguards were inserted in the Treaties. When defining the legal value of the CFR, the Article 6 of the TEU states that "the provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties" and that rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions Kohlen-und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Commission (1974) ECR 00491. This seems to be connected with the fact that not all of the Members States were parties to the ECHR at that time. For example, France did not accede the Convention until 1974 (exact date of ratification was 3 May 1974). Although the ECJ's judgment dates from 14 May 1974, we should bear in mind that it was formulated before. 4 Article 6(1) TEU: "The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties." 5 According to the principle of conferral the Union acts only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties (while competences not conferred upon the Union remain with the Member States) ( § 2). The principle of subsidiarity provides that when the Union does not exclusive competence in certain area, that it acts "only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States..., but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level" ( § 3). The third principle asks from The Union not to exceed with its actions what is necessary for achieving the aims of the EU ( § 4). It is also worth noting that the Treaty of Lisbon introduced division of competences in three categories: exclusive competences of the Union (Article 3 TFEU), shared competences (Article 4) and competence to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States (Article 6).
(Chapter VII of the Charter) and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions (Paragraph 1, Subpara. 2 and 3).
From Article 51 (Title VII) of the Charter follows that provisions of the Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the EU (with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity) and to the Member States when they are implementing Union law. 6 Similarly to the introduced safeguards within Article 6 of the TEU, Paragraph 2 of Article 51 of the CFR provides that the Charter does not establish any new power or task, neither does it modify powers and tasks as defined by the Treaties (so-called standstill clause).
However, neither the defining of the aim in the CFR (from the preamble it can be seen that the reaffirmation of fundamental rights in six chapters of the Charter has the aim of making those rights more visible in order to strengthen their protection, what is found to be necessary in the light of changes in society), nor above mentioned safeguards did influence the decision of some Member States to "opt out" from the Charter by signing the Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and the United Kingdom (so called British-Polish Protocol) 7 or making similar declarations on it 8 .
Since every Member State has its own reasons for such actions and in compliance with the aim of this work, further analysis will be focused on the Polish perspective of the fundamental rights protection in the EU and the Protocol itself. 6 Same requirement of the connection to the EU law can be withdrawn from the case-law of the ECJ. For example, in Wachauf case (Case 5/88, Hubert Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft (1989) ECR 02609) it is stated that: "...requirements of the protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal order ...are also binding on the Member States when they implement Community rules...the Member States must, as far as possible, apply those rules in accordance with those requirements." ( § 19) . It seems, however, that requirement of the fundamental rights protection is necessarily respected also in cases where Member States derogate from Union law (see, for example p. 43. in the ERT case (Case 260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others (1991) ECR I-02925)). Moreover, some authors distinct the scope of application of EC law (as well as binding force of fundamental rights protection) and the scope of implementation of Union law, emphasising the much broader scope of the first one; and find that the necessary link to the Community law is being more and more weakened in the jurisprudence of the ECJ. Continuous weakening of the link with Community law is found particularly in cases that concern non-discrimination principle on grounds of nationality, attention will be given to its legal significance and the question whether the Protocol really is an opt-out from the CFR or just an interpretative instrument. In subsequent analysis, reasons that motivated Poland to join the Protocol will be presented through the prism of current EU law and legal standards that are binding upon Poland outside the EU framework, in order to answer the question of (un)justified scepticism in State's approach toward the Charter (or some of its provisions). Finally, a discussion will focus on the consequences that Protocol may have on the protection of rights of individuals. In concluding remarks, certain problems that showed significant within the "Protocol context" will be pointed out as well; particularly, 12 Prof. Dashwood sees it as a "part of the belt-and-braces approach of the Government", in line with the negation of creation of new rights in the Charter or enlarging the possibility of act being challanged on grounds of fundamental rights, concluding that the Protocol provided "additional, but unnecessary protection"; Jane Golding considers that the main aim is " a certainty that all the angles are covered"; prof. Shaw defines the Protocol as "a Declaration masquerading as a Protocol"; Martin Howe QC questions even special position of the United Kingdom or Poland, discussing the possibility that it is simply declaratory act of the consequences Charter has across the whole EU; even British Government discussed if it is only an "interpretative guide" that just reaffirms the safeguards already provided within the CFR. For more about the discussion on the interpretative character of the Protocol see The ). There are also some provisions that refer both, to Community law and national laws. 16 The CFR refers to national laws and practices once more in its general provisions. As the amended Paragraph 6 to Article 52 (comparing to its version from the year 2000) provides, "full account shall be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter".
From Article 2 of the Protocol that refers to such provisions we can draw two conclusions:
first, for the application of those provisions it is necessary that they are confirmed in Polish law or practices and, second, that the application is possible only within the scope of protection as defined by Polish law and practices (this concerns also the Chapter IV of the CFR, since Article 1(2) of the Protocol provides similar limitations). It may seem that intention of the Protocol was to clarify that the Charter does not recognise any new rights, and, that in cases of referral to national laws scope of protection provided by Member State is to be strictly respected. Practical implication of such limitation is that, concerning the citizens 15 Article 35 specifies that exercise of that right will be guaranteed "under the conditions established by national laws and practices". 16 See for example Article 16 (freedom to contact a business), Article 27 (workers' right to information and consultation within the undertaking), Article 28 (right of collective bargaining and action), Article 30 (protection in the event of unjustified dismissal), Article 34 (social security and social assistance) and Article 36 (access to services of general economic interest).
of contracting parties who seek for the protection of their rights that are allegedly violated in some situation connected to the EU law, they will have to prove that the invoked (Charter's) right exists in their national law and get the protection within the provided (national) framework.
However, all the above mentioned consequences have little significance when we take into consideration the differences between the Polish and CFR system of protection. We should bear in mind that, on the one hand, the CFR reaffirms the rights which can be find in different international treaties and constitutions of the Member States and that, on the other hand, the Republic of Poland is a party of many international treaties concerning human rights protection (and, unlike the United Kingdom, accepts monistic approach towards international law). Indeed, comparisons of the Polish legal system (especially constitutional provisions and of the international treaties which it is a party to) with the one introduced with the CFR shows little differences. Wyrozumska, A., Beside the lack of reference to God in the Preamble, as main arguments against the Charter they also invoke issues connected to right to life and non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. Wyrzykowski, M., page 33. . 24 In the European Parliament's Resolution, they call on Polish authorities to refrain from proposing or adopting legislation that would be inconsistent with the EU policy on
LGBT's 25 rights protection ( § 10); moreover, to condemn and take measures against declarations by public leaders inciting discrimination and hatred based on sexual orientation ( § 11); and finally, it is suggested that a delegation is sent which would give a clear picture of the situation in Poland and start dialogue among concerned parties ( § 13).
As far as "marriage" is concerned, it is clear from Polish law that it refers only to opposite-sex couples when defining it: "Marriage, being a union of a man and a woman..."
(Article 18 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997). 26 Other institutions as registered partnership, for example, are not recognised by Polish law. But not only that it is not allowed for same-sex couples to get married in Poland, but the examples from practice show that they are also being unabled (or at least they meet big difficulties) when trying to enter the marriage or registered partnership in countries whose laws allow them to. That it is not the random case shows the finding that instruction not to provide same-sex couples certificates that confirm their unmarried status (which they are usually asked to present abroad) was sent to local governments by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, with explanation that Polish law recognises only heterosexual marriages. LGBT persons (ten cases qualified for further investigation). These cases raised issues of discrimination in organising public assemblies, discrimination in employment, a lack of respect for the human dignity of LGBT persons in public debates, discrimination in the course of law enforcement activities undertaken by the police as well as discrimination regarding voluntary blood donation. When defining "family members" for the purposes of its application, the first Directive refers . 31 In the FRA Report it is discussed whether such solution violates the right to private life and the principle of non-discrimination, since it's not allowed for a durable relationship to continue by joining partners and same-sex couples are deprived of rights that are granted to opposite-sex couples in marriage when a certain Member State does not recognise same-sex marriages. Pages 106-107. 32 Speaking of possible new regulations in the field of family law in the EU, the Article 81 TFEU (ex 65 TEC) on judicial co-operation in civil matters should be mentioned. In paragraph 3 it is stated: "...The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt a decision determining those aspects of family law with cross-border implications which may be the subject of acts adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure. The Council shall act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament. The proposal...shall be notified to the national Parliaments. If a national Parliament makes known its opposition within six months of the date of such notification, the decision shall not be adopted. In the absence of opposition, the Council may adopt the decision.".
As far as the CFR is concerned, it is true that it does not provide a definition of a marriage, but when granting the right to marry and right to found a family in Article 9 it says that they "shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights". Asking for a definition of the marriage or, more particularly, the definition which would include only opposite-sex marriages in the Charter, does not seem realistic when we take into consideration that there are 27 Member States of the EU that differently regulate that question and that some of them recognise same-sex marriages in their legislation (e.g.
Spain, Belgium, Norway). Paragraph 1 : "Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 1): "Within the limits of the powers conferred upon the Community, this Directive shall apply to all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies, in relation to: (a) conditions for access to employment, to self-employment and to occupation, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of activity and at all levels of the professional hierarchy, including promotion; (b) access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical work experience; (c) employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay; (d) membership of and involvement in an organisation of workers or employers, or any organisation whose members carry on a particular profession, including the benefits provided for by such organisations; (e) social protection, including social security and healthcare; (f) social advantages; (g) education; (h) access to and supply of goods and services which are available to the public, including housing." which the RED applies (10 Member States 39 ), for example, social protection, education or access to and supply of goods and services. Since some Member States are showing tendency to join the first group in widening the scope of the Employment Equality Directive and since it seems unjustifiable to support current "hierarchy of grounds" 40 there is an initiative within the EU to adopt so-called "Horizontal Directive" which would prohibit discrimination on grounds of religion and belief, sexual orientation, age and disability outside of the employment sphere (in other words, to the RED's scope of application). The European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR) first stated that in principle, the protection of the family in traditional sense ("union of a man and a woman") is a legitimate reason which might justify differences in treatment ( § 98). Before its ruling the ECtHR took into consideration that in pursuance of that aim there is a variety of measures that might be implemented by the State and that the Convention is to be interpreted in the light of "developments in society and changes in the perception of social, civil-status and relational issues, including the fact that there is not just one way or one choice in the sphere of leading 39 It is interesting to notice there was a proposal in Poland on broadening the scope of Directive to almost all fields the RED covers, except the access to good and services. More about it in FRA Report, page 25-35. 40 This term is used to show that grounds of racial or ethnic origin enjoy higher protection than others from the Article 19 TFEU, as sexual orientation, do. The practical consequence is that, for example, same-sex couple that is denied of the room in a hotel on that ground cannot get protection from Directives, while Roma couple can, because the RED covers the "access to and supply of goods and services". 47 In § 93 the ECtHR found that "a rapid evolution of social attitudes towards same-sex couples has taken place in many member States. Since then a considerable number of member States have afforded legal recognition to same-sex couples...Certain provisions of EU law also reflect a growing tendency to include same-sex couples in the notion of "family"". It continued in § 94 that "In view of this evolution the Court considers it artificial to maintain the view that, in contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy "family life" for the purposes of Article 8. Consequently the relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of "family life", just as the relationship of a different-sex couple in the same situation would.". See also the case of P. B and J.S. v . Austria, where the ECtHR stated the same in § 30 (although , in line with changes in legislation in question, it did not find the violation of Artcle 14 and Article 8). Case P.B. and J.S. v.Austra, 22 July 2010, Application no. 18984/02. 48 It is interesting to notice that in the case Schalk and Kopf v.Austria, concerning the alleged violation of the Article 12, the ECtHR took into consideration the right to marry as defined by the CFR and held that it would no longer consider that Article 12 must in all circumstances be limited to marriage between opposite-sex couples. It is added, however, that "marriage has deep-rooted social and cultural connotations which may differ largely developed on the basis of other Articles, other rights, than the right to marry, what is important for clarifying the distinction between the right of the States not to recognise samesex marriages and their obligation to eliminate unjustified discrimination and not to violate other rights of individuals. That distinction is even more important within the EU legal system, where the Member States' competences and the discretion they enjoy in certain fields has to be taken into account, but in respect of the necessity to secure the full effectiveness of EU law. That the case-law develops in that direction shows the given example of Maruko case.
Second example, case Tysiąc v. Poland 49 , concerns the abortion and will be presented to show that, comparing to the EU system, ECHR system has broader scope of application in such fields. According to the facts of the case, the applicant was a pregnant woman for whom numerous doctors concluded that she was facing serious health risk (blindness) if continuing pregnancy, but she was refused to issue a certificate which would allow her to terminate her pregnancy. After the delivery, her eyesight was badly damaged. Although Polish law legitimises abortion in certain cases (when pregnancy endangers mother's life or health, the one of the foetus or it is a result of criminal act) the ECtHR found that the current law makes the abortion provisions ineffective (criminalisation that doctors are facing; inappropriate retrospective measures as civil law tort or criminal proceedings; the absence of preventive procedure, with taking into account time factor, the need to consider patient's views) 50 . On those findings the ECtHR concluded that the Article 8 (right to private life) was violated, because the State failed in its obligation to adopt effective measures ( § 128 and 130).
When we take into consideration these two examples of developing standards within the ECHR system that is binding upon Poland, intentions to avoid imposing new standards within the EU by excluding or limiting the application of the CFR seems even more unreasonable.
SOCIAL INTEREST OF THE STATE
Some politicians and Polish Ombudsman claimed that Protocol protects Polish social interests, since otherwise employment standards would become higher. 51 It is well known that from one society to another. The Court reiterates that it must not rush to substitute its own judgment in place of that of the national authorities, who are best placed to assess and respond to the needs of society"(p. 62. States. 53 Although the "representation and collective defence of workers and employers interests" is one of those field, Paragraph 5 of the same Article says that the provision there provided will not apply "to pay, the right to association, the right to strike or the right to finding that the CFR is premature, unclear and ambiguous; that disturbs the balance between the powers by granting too many rights to judges, etc. Wyrzykowski, M., pages 31-33. 52 Footnote 14. 53 Article 153 (1): "With a view to achieving the objectives of Article 151, the Union shall support and complement the activities of the Member States in the following fields: (a) improvement in particular of the working environment to protect workers' health and safety; (b) working conditions; (c) social security and social protection of workers; (d) protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated; (e) the information and consultation of workers; (f) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including codetermination, subject to paragraph 5; (g) conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory; (h) the integration of persons excluded from the labour market, without prejudice to Article 166; (i) equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work; (j) the combating of social exclusion; (k) the modernisation of social protection systems without prejudice to point (c , when certain fundamental right is confronted to one of the market freedoms of the EU, the ECJ "strikes the balance" between them. In mentioned cases, the ECJ left to national courts to apply such normative balancing to the cases before them. However, recent case-law shows that the ECJ took more active role in determining the proper balance between the right to collective action (including strike) and the market freedoms.
Viking case 56 (see also case Laval

57
) is an example where the right to collective action was to be balanced with the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services. The dispute arose when shipping company Viking decided to reflag one of its ships "Rosella" to an Estonian flag, in order to acquire cheaper labour and the Finnish Seamen's Union insisted on applying Finnish collective agreement on those workers. Disagreement with the Viking company led to collective action and calling international trade unions to support it. The ECJ 54 The case concerns the prohibition of the operation of games that involve "killing" human targets, thus, the "human dignity" was confronted to the freedom to provide services. ruling starts with finding that such action (with aim to protect the jobs and conditions of employment) could be considered to fall within the objective of protecting workers, which the EU social policy encompasses. However, the ECJ continued, that would not be the case in a situation where "the jobs or conditions of employment at issue were not jeopardised or under serious threat." ( § 81). Although the ECJ proceeded that it is for national courts to decide whether such requirements are met in the present case and whether the taken measure of collective action does not go beyond what is necessary in achieving the legitimate aim 58 , the guideline provided in Paragraph 81 shows more active and decisive role of the ECJ in "striking the balance", especially when we take into consideration that standards as "jeopardised" or "serious threat" are hard to be achieved and proved in practice.
Irrespective of discussion what impact such development of the ECJ's case-law may (or may not) have on Polish "fears" that their comparative advantage might be lost, the fact is that outside the CFR there is defined social policy of the EU in the Treaties, invoked in case-law and balanced with other Union's policies; and standards developed therein are binding upon
Poland no matter the consequences the Protocol may have.
PROPERTY CLAIMS CONNECTED TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR
As a result of the Second World War German citizens were deprived of their properties which became part of Polish territory. That was a basis for some political statements that the CFR may enable those German citizens to succeed with their claims against Polish citizens that now live on those lands. 59 This "reason" seems to lack a legal reasoning for many causes.
First of all, including the right to property in the CFR 60 does not mean that this is a proper ground for such property claims concerning questions of expropriation and compensation. We must always bear in mind special features of the EU system of fundamental rights protection, 
OTHER OBJECTIONS TO THE CFR 63
If we conclude that the reasons for signing the Protocol and taking somewhat restrictive approach toward the application of the CFR are based on the extensive or even overinterpretation of the Charter, the question that logically follows is -how should the CFR be interpreted? Although a lot has been said about limitations on the application of the Charter, from the point of view of "fears" that had led to the signing of the Protocol more has to be said about the scope and interpretation of rights and principles that the CFR encompasses.
AMBIGUITY OF THE CFR -RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES
Unclear distinction between rights and principles in the Charter seems to be one of the most important issues connected to the application of the Charter. That it is so, confirms the Although it may seem that provided interpretation solves the problem of distinction between rights and principles, situation becomes less clear when we take a look at the content of the CFR, which does not give clear distinction between them. Indeed, terms used in the Charter -"must be respected and protected", "the Union shall respect", "shall be guaranteed", 63 The aim of this chapter is to analyse some of the allegations to the Charter that may have been found in public discussions (see, for example, footnote 47), that seem important for discussion whether the "fear" of widening EU competences on the basis of the CFR (which fear is the base of all the reasons that explain joining the Protocol) is, in general, a result of over-interpretation of the Charter.
If we try to place the rights and principles at which this work was mostly focused within this distinction, we can see that right to marry and right to found a family belong to the second group, because of their reference to national laws and practices. As far as social rights are concerned, we may conclude that they mostly belong to the third group (e.g. social security
and social assistance, Article 34), but the right of collective bargaining and action, to which most attention was paid, belongs to the rights, not principles (although, to the second group, because it refers to Union law and national laws and practices).
REFERRING TO RIGHTS AS TO WHICH THE EU DOES NOT HAVE
COMPETENCES
Another basis for extensive interpretation of the CFR are those rights and freedoms (e.g. freedom of thought, conscience and religion, Article 10) which concern areas where the EU has no competences. But before we draw any conclusions as to whether that may lead to widening of the competences of the EU, we must seek for the real aim of inclusion of such rights in the Charter. Warszawa, 2009, pages 145 -167. 65 According to Bodnar, autonomous principles ("the EU recognises and respects") are those for which the Charter strictly determines the way they should be executed. Non-autonomous principles ("established in Union law and national law and practices"), on the other hand, are more opened ones, leaving more space for their fulfilment with normative content. Pages 157-158. 66 For example, Article 37 (Environmental protection): "A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development."
and religion would play its role in a way that the problem of rituals performed in different religions should be taken into consideration in such case. 67 This example shows that "fears" of the wider competences of the EU to which the CFR serves as a good basis are often result of the over-interpretation of the Charter, that does not take account about the broader, legal context of the EU actions which may justify providing in the Charter even such provisions, that at first sight have nothing in common with the EU. This is even more important in the context of entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon that widens Union's competences in many areas. We can conclude that the CFR system guarantees as minimum level of protection the level reached within the ECHR system, but it also gives basis for enhanced protection of those rights. This "minimum level of protection" is a consequence of the ECtHR's rulings on the question whether and under which conditions the ECtHR can review EC law. 69 Bosphorus 67 Bodnar, A., page 150. 68 Prof. Ingolf Pernice draws a comparison of the process in the EU with the development of fundamental rights in general; stating that visibility of those rights and the legally binding character of the CFR are conditions for accepting new competences at the Union level. In the framework of the changes in the EU pillar system which reduce direct control and legitimisation of such policies by national governments, the CFR plays the same role the Magna Carta Libertatum (1215.), Virginia Bill of Rights(1776.) and similar documents did -a moderation of political power and constituting governing power as a trustee of the citizens. Those wordings are in line with the preamble of the CFR when it says that the EU "places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice." 69 According to current situation (which will be changed if and when the EU accesses to the ECHR), the ECtHR reviews EC law indirectly -Member States are held responsible for all acts or omissions of their organs, regardless of whether such act or omission is a consequence of domestic law or international obligations they are obliged to comply with (including cases of transferred sovereign power to an international/supranational case 70 is important because it introduced a "test of equivalence" of human rights protection at Community level to the one provided by the ECHR. The ECtHR stated that it is presumed that State has not departed from the ECHR requirements when implementing legal obligations that derive from the membership in the organisation at issue, if the protection of fundamental rights (as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance) is at least equivalent to that for which the ECHR provides ( § 155). That presumption can be rebutted in the circumstances of the particular case if "it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient" ( § 156). However, the standard of "manifest deficiency" seems to be difficult to achieve in practice. 71 Bosphorus case can be compared to Solange II judgment of German Federal Constitutional Tribunal (1986.) which defined in a similar manner the relation between Union's and national system of fundamental rights protection (as long as standards of protection at the EU level are adequate to German ones). Within the multi-level system of fundamental rights protection it is very important for those relations to be defined in a way that enables their co-existence and further developments. Moreover, it is necessary for safeguarding of the supremacy of EU law over national laws to provide at least the level of protection as national laws (constitutions) or ECHR (on basis of which national laws are reviewed) do. Wordings of the CFR should be read with taking into consideration the given context and it should not be concluded that standards of protection have to be the same 72 (even when the ECJ relies on national constitutions or the ECHR).
Emphasising the possibility of more extensive protection at Union's level is particularly important in fields as anti-discrimination law, where the EU has more competences and, thus, the ECHR system, on the other hand, non-discrimination principle can be invoked only in connection with the alleged violation of some other right or freedom that the ECHR recognises. Those are: − Article 9 covers the same field as Article 12 of the ECHR, but its scope may be extended to other forms of marriage if these are established by national legislation -Article 12(1) corresponds to Article 11 of the ECHR, but its scope is extended to European Union level − Article 14(1) corresponds to Article 2 of the Protocol to the ECHR, but its scope is extended to cover access to vocational and continuing training − Article 14(3) corresponds to Article 2 of the Protocol to the ECHR as regards the rights of Parents − Article 47(2) and (3) correspond to Article 6(1) of the ECHR, but the limitation to the determination of civil rights and obligations or criminal charges does not apply as regards Union law and its implementation − Article 50 corresponds to Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR, but its scope is extended to European Union level between the Courts of the Member States. − Finally, citizens of the European Union may not be considered as aliens in the scope of the application of Community law, because of the prohibition of any discrimination on grounds of extensive protection with the CFR system is logical consequences of the fact Member States differently solve that question and that some of them recognise same-sex marriages.
However, it is emphasized that those lists reflect the current stage and do not preclude possible changes and development in the law, legislation and the Treaties. This is important for realising that relation between the EU and ECHR system of fundamental rights protection is not a static one and needs to be (re)considered from the point of view of changes in society and developments in legal protection. In other words, when the ECJ "draws inspiration" from the ECHR, we should not expect "copy-pasted" case-law of the ECtHR. Although the harmonised protection within multi-level system is favourable, it definitely should not be an obstacle for more enhanced protection of fundamental rights, especially when we take into consideration differences in systems. As it was mentioned, in some areas EU has more competences (e.g. anti-discrimination law) and in some areas the ECtHR is more competent to rule (e.g. Tysiąc case). Speaking of differences in systems, it is enough to take into consideration "common values" of 27 Member States of the EU and the level of protection that ECHR system (47 countries!) provides. Multi-level protection of fundamental rights is a reality and it is wrong to conclude that because of their differences or the areas where they over-lap they collide. We must bear in mind that over-lapping is not a disadvantage by itself.
Quite contrary, it may strengthen protection of fundamental rights if due regard is paid to changes and developments that occur in certain areas.
nationality. The limitations provided for by Article 16 of the ECHR as regards the rights of aliens therefore do not apply to them in this context.
CONSEQUENCES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION
(conclusion before the conclusion) Given analysis showed that the Protocol considered as an interpretative instrument will not play significant role for the protection of rights of individuals in practice because of the fact that Poland is already bounded upon the same (or similar) standards outside the CFR system. But no matter what are the limitations imposed by the Protocol or what will their impacts be in practice when the CFR is invoked, we can claim that the same protection of fundamental rights within the EU can be achieved on the basis of general principles of the EU law, which are binding upon Poland. Since it will be shown on that basis that the Protocol is insignificant from the point of view of its final consequences in practice, the following chapters will also try to give an insight in more general issues of the fundamental rights protection that the Protocol indicated.
5.1.GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW -a back-door for fundamental rights protection
General principles of the EU consist of two elements -ECHR system (and other international treaties which are binding upon Member States, what can be concluded from the case-law, as it was explained at the beginning) and constitutional traditions common to Member States. Although there are many international treaties on human rights, the ECHR has the most significant role within the EU fundamental rights protection. In analysing why it is like that, we can excerpt two main reasons: the fact that all the 27 Member States of the EU are bounded upon it and the scope of its application 78 . This "priority" among other international treaties evolved through the case-law of the ECJ gradually -from the case other cases of falling within the scope of EU law because of some specific substantive rule applicable to that situation.
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The question that stays open is how the full effectiveness of EU law, particularly of the nondiscrimination principle on grounds of sexual orientation, should be ensured in cases that fall within the Member States discretion ("marriage"), taking into consideration diversity of solutions that Member States provide? How to solve the question, for example, of same-sex couple that got married in Belgium and because of work moves to Poland where their marriage will not be recognised?
The future case-law will give answer to such questions. Maybe the Court will go one step forward in stating that "nevertheless, Member States must comply with EU law", especially in line with given proposals that do not seek for imposing the institution of same-sex marriages on the Member States, but merely delimitating the discriminative effects by ensuring the same rights and advantages as the opposite-sex couples have. Beside the developments in law of the EU, some final remarks should be given on its connection with social and cultural area that the EU encompasses and which connection showed to be significant for solving issues based on differences among the Member States
CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION
There are two co-existent theories in the area of human rights policy -universalism and cultural relativism. According to the first one, human rights are a completely universal value, independent of cultural, historical or economic factors. The second theory implies that human rights are subject of relativisation in the context of foreign policy, meaning that different standards might be applicable to different countries, even when the same system of a certain treaty applies to them. Nevertheless, allegations may be found that although all those differences must be borne in mind, it is the duty of states to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems. Warszawa, 2007, pages 16-19. 93 Concerning the discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation see, for example, FRA's report: "Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the EU Member States: Part IIThe Social Situation" at:
6. CONCLUSION
The aim of this work was to give an overview on the fundamental rights protection in the EU and to analyse the questions that entering into force of the CFR and the Protocol on its application arose.
As it was shown, the wording of the Protocol might be interpreted in a way to conclude that the Protocol is more an interpretative instrument than an opt-out. Tree important conclusions derive from that: first, as regards the provisions to which the Protocol refers to, individuals in Poland may have to prove their existence in the national law; second, the fact that possible development of standards that would bind Poland is already a reality evolving outside the CFR system shows that "fears" toward the CFR were unreasonable; and third, regardless how the Protocol is interpreted, there are always general principles of the EU law that the ECJ may use as a backdoor for providing the protection to individuals.
How should the Protocol's significance finally be valued?
We may conclude as professor Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère did: "although the Protocol would probably provoke a significant amount of discussion and debate among lawyers, it might in the end produce little in the way of case-law".
However, irrespective of its little or no legal significance for the protection of fundamental rights in practice, we can say that Protocol contributed to perceiving of the issues that Member States' reasons for signing the Protocol indicated-problem of protection of fundamental rights as "common values" on which the EU is founded in the area of diversity of 27 Member States. Nevertheless, the respect given to such differences and work on promotion of development of fundamental rights protection may be considered as a good way for solving those questiones that stayed opened after entering into force of the CFR.
http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA_hdgso_report_Part%202_en.pdf.
